❯Shielded
Turnstile Audit
Every shielded pool is sealed by a turnstile: value can only enter or leave by crossing into the transparent layer, and a pool can never hold less than zero. This page checks that invariant against the node's per-block value pools — every pool, every day. It reports only what the balances can prove; it does not guess at flows the chain does not expose.
The invariant
Across 3,643 days of measured value-pool readings, no shielded pool has ever held a negative balance. A pool going below zero is the only on-chain event that would prove counterfeit value crossed the turnstile. None has.▍Every pool, hard facts
Read from the node's per-block value pools. The lowest-ever balance and the never-negative check are the parts of a turnstile audit the chain actually lets you verify from the outside.
| Pool | Active since | Balance now | Lowest balance ever | Ever negative | Share of supply |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sprout | 2016-10-28 | 22,309 ZEC | 30 ZEC 2016-10-28 | no | 0.1% |
| Sapling | 2018-10-29 | 474,259 ZEC | 16,549 ZEC 2018-10-29 | no | 2.8% |
| Orchard | 2022-05-31 | 350,180 ZEC | 156 ZEC 2022-05-31 | no | 2.1% |
| Ironwood | 2026-07-28 | 4,113,682 ZEC | 133,046 ZEC 2026-07-28 | no | 24.2% |
▍Net flow by pool
Daily net flow is the day-over-day change in each pool's measured balance (7-day mean) — a difference of two readings, nothing modelled. Switch pools with the chips.
What this page does not claim
In June 2026 a value-balance flaw in the Orchard proving circuit was disclosed and fixed. Because Orchard hides note values, no outside observer can prove from chain data whether it was exploited before the fix — the value-pool balances remained non-negative throughout, which is consistent with no breach but cannot rule one out. ZecScope does not run statistical “exploit detectors” on hidden flows, because those cannot measure what they claim to; the only hard signal is the invariant above.